We study the effect of combining selfishness and altruism in atomic congestion games. We allow players to be partially altruistic and partially selfish and determine the impact of this behavior on the overall system performance. Surprisingly, our results indicate that, in general, by allowing players to be (even partially) altruistic, the overall system performance deteriorates. Instead, for the class of symmetric load balancing games, a balance between selfish and altruistic behavior improves system performance to optimality.
Introduction
Congestion games provide a natural model for antagonistic resource allocation in large-scale systems and have recently played a central role in algorithmic game theory. In a congestion game, a set of non-cooperative players, each controlling an unsplittable unit demand, compete over a set of resources. All players using a resource experience a latency (or cost) given by a non-negative and nondecreasing function of the total demand (or congestion) of the resource. Among a given set of resource subsets (or strategies), each player selects one selfishly trying to minimize her individual total cost, i.e., the sum of the latencies on the resources in the chosen strategy. Load balancing games are congestion games in which the strategies of the players are singletons. Load balancing games in which all players have all resources as singleton strategies are called symmetric.
A typical example of a congestion game stems from antagonistic routing on a communication network. In this setting, we have several network users, where each user wishes to send traffic between a source-destination pair of network nodes. Each user may select among all possible paths connecting her sourcedestination pair of nodes. A natural objective for a user is to route her traffic using as less congested links as possible. This situation can be modelled by a congestion game where the users of the network are the players and the communication links correspond to the resources. In a load balancing game, we may think of the resources as servers and the players as clients wishing to get served by one of the servers. Then, the load balancing game is used to model the inherent selfishness of the clients in the sense that each of them desires to be served by the least loaded server.
A natural solution concept that captures stable outcomes in a (congestion) game is that of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), a configuration where no player can decrease her individual cost by unilaterally changing her strategy. Rosenthal [13] proved that the PNE of congestion games correspond to the local optima of a natural potential function, and thus every congestion game admits a PNE. Much of the recent literature on congestion games has focused on quantifying the inefficiency due to the players' selfish behavior. It is well known that a PNE may not optimize the system performance, usually measured by the total cost incurred by all players. The main tool for quantifying and understanding the performance degradation due to selfishness has been the price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10] (see also [12] ). The price of anarchy is the worst-case ratio of the total cost of a PNE to the optimal total cost.
Many recent papers have provided tight upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy for several interesting classes of congestion games, mostly congestion games with linear and polynomial latencies. Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] proved that the price of anarchy of congestion games is 5/2 for linear latencies and d Θ(d) for polynomial latencies of degree d. Subsequently, Aland et al. [1] obtained exact bounds on the price of anarchy for congestion games with polynomial latencies. Caragiannis et al. [4] proved that the same bounds hold for load balancing games as well. For symmetric load balancing games, Lücking et al. [11] proved that the price of anarchy is 4/3.
In this paper, we are interested in the impact of altruistic behavior on the efficiency of atomic congestion games with linear latency functions. We assume that a player with completely altruistic behavior aims to minimize the total latency incurred by the other players. We also consider types of behavior that lie between completely altruistic behavior and selfishness. In this respect, we use a parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1] and consider a player to be ξ-altruistic is she aims to minimize the linear combination of the total latency incurred by the other players and her latency with coefficients ξ and 1 − ξ respectively. Hence, an 1-altruistic player acts completely altruistically while a 0-altruistic one is selfish.
Intuitively, altruism should be considered as a synonym for trustworthy behavior. In contrast to this intuition, we demonstrate rather surprising results. We show that having players that behave completely altruistically may lead to a significant deterioration of performance. More importantly, even a small degree of altruism may have a negative effect on performance compared to the case of selfish players. These results hold for general atomic congestion games in which players may have different strategy sets. This asymmetry seems to be incompatible with altruism. On the contrary, in simpler games such as symmetric load balancing games, we prove that a balance between altruism and selfishness in the players' behavior leads to optimal performance.
In technical terms, we show the following results which extend the known bounds on the price of anarchy of games with selfish players to games with ξ-altruistic ones:
-The price of anarchy of atomic congestion games with ξ-altruistic players is at most Surprisingly, our first set of results indicates that altruism may be harmful in general since the price of anarchy increases from 5/2 to unbounded as the degree of altruism increases from 0 to 1. Hence, selfishness is more beneficial than altruism in general. Our second set of results establishes a different setting for symmetric load balancing games. Interestingly, a balance between altruistic and selfish behavior leads to optimal performance (i.e., the price of anarchy is 1 and the equilibria reached are optimal). This has to be compared to the tight bound of 4/3 on the price of anarchy with selfish players. Again, completely altruistic behavior leads to an unbounded price of anarchy.
In our upper bound proofs, we follow the standard high-level analysis ideas that have been used in the literature (see [3] ) in order to compare the cost of equilibria to the cost of optimal assignments but adapt it to the case of altruistic players. For each player, we express with an inequality its preference to the strategy she uses in the equilibrium instead of the one she uses in the optimal assignment. For general atomic congestion games, by summing these inequalities over all players, we obtain an upper bound on the cost of the equilibrium in terms of quantities characterizing both the equilibrium and the optimal assignment. Then, we need to use new inequalities on the non-negative integers in order to obtain a direct relation between the cost of the equilibrium and the optimal assignment. In symmetric load balancing, we exploit the symmetry in order to obtain a better relation between the cost of the equilibrium and the optimal cost. In our analysis, we use the inequalities expressing the preference of a carefully selected set of players and develop new inequalities over non-negative integers in order to obtain our upper bound.
Chen and Kempe [6] have considered similar questions in non-atomic congestion games, i.e., games with an infinite number of players each controlling a negligibly small amount of traffic. Our findings are inherently different than theirs as in non-atomic congestion games the system performance improves as the degree of altruism of the players increases. Hoefer and Skopalik [9] consider atomic congestion games using a slightly different definition of altruism, which corresponds to ξ-altruistic behavior with ξ ∈ [0, 1/2] in our model. They mainly present complexity results for the computation of equilibria in the corresponding congestion games and do not address questions related to the price of anarchy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary definitions and properties of altruistic players in Section 2. Our upper bounds for atomic congestion games and the corresponding lower bounds are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 is devoted to our results regarding symmetric load balancing. We conclude in Section 6 with a discussion on possible extensions of our work.
Preliminaries
In this section we formally define the model and establish characteristic inequalities that capture the players' behavior.
In atomic congestion games there is a set E of resources, each resource e having a non-negative and non-decreasing latency function f e defined over nonnegative numbers, and a set of n players. Each player i has a set of strategies S i ⊆ 2 E (each strategy of player i is a set of resources) and controls an unsplittable unit demand. An assignment A = (A 1 , ..., A n ) is a vector of strategies, one strategy for each player. The cost of player i for an assignment A is defined as cost i (A) = ∑ e∈Ai f e (n e (A)), where n e (A) is the number of players using resource e in A, while the social cost of an assignment is the total cost of all players. An assignment is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to another strategy, i.e., cost i (A) ≤ cost i (A −i , s) for any player i and for any s ∈ S i , where (A −i , s) is the assignment produced from A if player i deviates from A i to s. This inequality is also known as the Nash condition. A congestion game is called symmetric when all players share the same set of strategies. Load balancing games are congestion games where the strategies of the players are singleton sets. The price of anarchy of a congestion game is defined as the ratio of the maximum social cost over all Nash equilibria over the optimal cost. The price of anarchy for a class of congestion games is simply the highest price of anarchy among all games belonging to that class.
In this paper, we consider latency functions of the form f e (x) = α e x + β e for each resource e, where α e , β e are non-negative constants. Then, the cost of a player i for an assignment A becomes cost i (A) = ∑ e∈Ai (α e n e (A) + β e ), while the social cost becomes ∑
) .
We now proceed to modify the model so that altruism is taken into account. We assume that each player i is partially altruistic, in the sense that she tries to minimize a function depending on the total cost of all other players and the total latency she experiences. We say that player i following a strategy A i is ξ-altruistic, where ξ ∈ [0, 1], when her cost function is
Clearly, when ξ = 0 then player i wishes to minimize her total latency, while when ξ = 1 player i wishes to minimize the total latency of all other players. Now, consider two assignments A and A ′ that differ in the strategy of player i and let p 1 and p 2 be the strategies of i in the two assignments. Furthermore, by slightly abusing notation, we let n e = n e (A) and n ′ e = n e (A ′ ). Assume that assignment A is an equilibrium; the cost of player i under A is
where ⊖ is the symmetric difference operator in set theory, i.e., for two sets a,
Consider now the second assignment A ′ = (A −i , p 2 ) in which player i has changed her strategy from p 1 to p 2 . Observe that n ′ e = n e + 1 for e ∈ p 2 \ p 1 , n ′ e = n e − 1 for e ∈ p 1 \ p 2 and n ′ e = n e otherwise. Her cost under the second assignment is
(α e (n e + 1) + β e )   .
Since player i has no incentive to change her strategy from p 1 to p 2 , we obtain
( α e (n e + 1) 2 + β e (n e + 1)
(α e (n e + 1) + β e ), which implies that ∑
e∈p1\p2
(α e (n e − ξ)
and, equivalently,
Observe that when ξ = 0, the above inequality is merely the Nash condition. In general, this condition implies that, given an assignment A −i of the remaining players, a ξ-altruistic player i aims to select a strategy s from S i such that the expression ∑
is minimized. In the rest of this paper, we will assume, without loss of generality, that β e = 0 for all resources. Our lower bound constructions exhibit this property, while the proofs of our upper bounds carry over even with non-zero values of β e .
Upper Bounds for Atomic Congestion Games
In this section we describe our upper bounds concerning the price of anarchy for atomic congestion games and ξ-altruistic players. In our proofs we use the following two technical lemmas.
Lemma 1. For all integers x, y ≥ 0 and ξ ∈ [0, 1/2] it holds that
Proof. Consider the function
It suffices to prove that f (x, y) ≥ 0 when x, y are non-negative integers and ξ ∈ [0, 1/2]. We start with the case x = y = k. Then,
We now consider the case x = k and y = k + z, where k ≥ 0 and z ≥ 1. Then,
Finally, we consider the case where x = k + z and y = k, where k ≥ 0 and z ≥ 1. Then,
Since z 
To prove the lemma it suffices to show that f (x, y) ≥ 0 when x, y are nonnegative integers and ξ ∈ [1/2, 1].
We first consider the case where
We now consider the case x > y and let x = k + z and y = k, where k ≥ 0 and z ≥ 1. Then,
Finally, we consider the case y > x and let x = k and y = k + z, where k ≥ 0 and z ≥ 1. Then,
We note that the above lemmas also hold for the more general case of possibly negative x and y, but it suffices to consider non-negative values for our purposes. We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. The price of anarchy of atomic congestion games with ξ-altruistic players is at most
Proof. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium and an optimal assignment, and denote by n e and o e the number of players using resource e in the two assignments. Furthermore, let p i1 and p i2 be the strategies of player i in the two assignments. Since player i is a ξ-altruistic player, it holds that
For the total latency of the pure Nash equilibrium, it holds that So, we obtain that the price of anarchy for this case is
⊓ ⊔
We observe that altruism is actually harmful, since the price of anarchy is minimized when ξ = 0, i.e., in the absence of altruism. Furthermore, when ξ = 1, i.e., players are completely altruistic, the price of anarchy is unbounded.
In this section we state our lower bounds on the price of anarchy. The constructions in the proofs are load balancing games and are similar to a construction used in [4] . In these constructions, we represent the load balancing game as a graph. In this graph, each node represents a machine, and each edge represents a player having as possible strategies the machines corresponding to the nodes defining the edge. 
Consider the assignment where all players select machines corresponding to the endpoint of their corresponding edge which is closer to the root of graph G. It is not hard to see that this is a Nash equilibrium, since machines corresponding to nodes of level i = 0, . . . , k − 1, have two players and latency 2( 
To compute the upper bound on the cost of the optimal assignment it suffices to consider the assignment where all players select the machines corresponding to nodes which are further from the root. We obtain that the cost opt of the optimal assignment is
Hence, for any ϵ > 0 and for sufficiently large k, the price of anarchy of the game is larger than cost opt ≥
We notice that this lower bound is tight for ξ ∈ [0, 1/2]. In order to prove a tight lower bound for the case ξ ∈ [1/2, 1], it suffices to focus on one line of k + 2 nodes and k + 1 edges hanging from the binary tree of the aforementioned graph (including the corresponding leaf).
Theorem 3.
For any ϵ > 0 and ξ ∈ [1/2, 1], there is a load balancing game with ξ-altruistic users, whose price of anarchy is at least
Consider the construction used in the proof of the previous theorem. We remind that the machine located at the node of the 2k +1 level, has latency function f 2k+1 (x) = (
, and the machines corresponding to nodes of
Similarly, the assignment, where all players select the machine corresponding to the node closer to the root, is a Nash equilibrium, whereas the players are optimally assigned to the machine corresponding to the node further from the root (considering the endpoints of the corresponding edge). Using similar analysis, we obtain that
We conclude, that for any ϵ > 0, and sufficiently large k, the price of anarchy of the game is larger than 
Symmetric Load Balancing Games
In this section, we consider the important class of symmetric load balancing games with ξ-altruistic players. In our proof, we make use of the following two technical lemmas. 
